We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about its strength, i.e., the likelihood that it gets hit by negative shocks. Managers can exert risk-prevention export to mitigate the consequences of such shocks. As time goes by, if no shock occurs, con dence improves. This attracts managers to the innovative sector. But, when con dence becomes high, less managers exerting low risk-prevention export also enter. This accelerates the growth of the industry, while inducing a decline in risk-prevention. The longer the boom, the stronger the con dence, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. While the above dynamics arise in the fi rst best, with asymmetric information there is excessive entry of inefficient managers, earning informational rents at the expense of inneficient managers. This inflates the innovative sector and increases its vulnerability.
Partenaire de recherche
Paul Woolley Research Initiative
Thème de recherche
Contracts on Organisational Structure