Référence

Helmuth Cremer et Philippe De Donder, « Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities », The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2016, à paraître.

Résumé

Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker’s past earnings) as opposed to the non- contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.

Mots-clés

generosity; redistributiveness; pay-as-you-go pensions; collective annuity; longevity; Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium;

Codes JEL

  • D78: Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
  • H55: Social Security and Public Pensions

Partenaire de recherche

Scor Chair

Thème de recherche

Longevity Risk, Long Term Care (Social) Insurance

Remplace

Helmuth Cremer et Philippe De Donder, « Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities », IDEI Working Paper, n° 827, mai 2014.